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Abstract 
From the Pearl Harbor intelligence debacle of 1941 to the Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction 
intelligence fiasco of 2002, intelligence failures have been a widely documented and reoccurring 
phenomenon. Indeed, from a historical perspective, intelligence failures appear to be inevitable 
and unavoidable. They are indivisible part of the history of intelligence, and they still seem to 
haunt the presence. In concurrence with the mainstream academic opinion on the subject, by 
utilizing qualitative research method, concretely, relying on the Orthodox approach, and by 
examining various primary and secondary sources, this project argues that the reason why 
intelligence failures are inevitable are the multifarious, endemic, interrelated factors, barriers or 
pathologies, which being closely connected to the basic role of intelligence and the nature of 
information, pose negative effects on the whole intelligence cycle, hinder both the clarity and 
accuracy of the intelligence analytical process, and erode the warning-response dynamic. It is 
important to be noted that because these obstacles are indeed numerous, it would be the aim of 
this project to examine the nature and function of the fundamental, most important, and most 
damaging factors and barriers in respect to the intelligence, warning-response and decision-
making processes. Specifically, it is the thesis of this paper to prove that the unavoidability of 
intelligence failures is due to the inherent pathologies and limitations of the human cognition, 
the endemic analytical problem of predictions from epistemological perspective, the mercurial 
time and space variables, the innate ambiguity of information and its excess  nowadays, the 
danger of the politicization of the intelligence cycle and the sheer impracticability of the 
solutions, which are assumed to eliminate the aforementioned problems. The project will then 
move on to implement this theoretical framework in order to provide a consistent explanatory 
format for the Yom Kippur war intelligence failure of 1973. It appears plausible to assert that 
the thesis of the project is corroborated by the Yom Kippur war intelligence fiasco, as the failure 
was not provoked by insufficient information, highly successful Egyptian or Syrian deception, or  
Israeli intelligence officers and commanders being incompetent or inexperienced. Per contra, the 
roots of the Israeli Intelligence debacle are strikingly similar to the ones delineated and 
discussed by the theoretical framework of this project.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Table of content  
 
Introduction----------------------------------------------------------------------page 6 
Chapter 1: The human cognition and its physical limitations------page 15 
Chapter 2: The Epistemological problem of predictions------------page 29 
Chapter 3: Fundamental obstacles to analytic accuracy------------page 35 
 Time and space variables-------------------------------------------page 35 
  The problem of the inherent ambiguity of information and its 
quantity nowadays---------------------------------------------------page 39 
  The problem of politicization--------------------------------------page 43 
 The elusiveness of solutions----------------------------------------page 49 
Chapter 4:  The Yom Kippur intelligence failure of 1973------------page 53 
Conclusion----------------------------------------------------------------------page 70 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
                                              Acknowledgements  
 
First and foremost, I would like to thank my family for their endless 
moral support and encouragement. 
Secondly, I am truly thankful to Doctor Claudia Hillebrand and Doctor 
Gerry Hughes for their priceless advice and patience towards me and 
my project. This dissertation would not have been possible without 
their guidance.  
Last but not least, I would like to show my gratitude to Professor Len 
Scott, for his modules provided me with excellent theoretical 
knowledge, which helped me understand the fascinating and misty 
academic field of intelligence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
Introduction 
 
The great Sun Tzu in his magnum opus, Art of War, posits: “Know the enemy and know yourself, 
and in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.”1 However, the history of intelligence has 
demonstrated that knowing yourself and the enemy is an elusive, misleading and difficult task. 
Clausewitz in his On War, in chapter “Information in War”, himself recognized the inherent 
difficulty in this:  “If we consider the actual basis for this information [every piece of 
information concerning the enemy and his country], how unreliable and transient it is, we soon 
realize that war is a flimsy structure that can easily collapse and bury us in its ruins.”2 Following 
this line of reasoning, Michael Handel has made a similar observation: ”In the past, it has often 
both explicitly and implicitly been assumed that intelligence work can be pursued by 
professionals, detached experts working within an objective environment, who would be   
capable of presenting the truth, as they best determine it, to decision-makers. The policy 
makers in this scenario will of course recognize the quality and relevance of the data in the best 
interest of their community. This purely rational decision-making model and belief in the 
viability of a ‘strictly professional intelligence process’ is nothing but an idealized normative 
function.  Like Clausewitz’s ‘War’ in practice, the real world of intelligence is a rife with political 
friction and contradictions, an environment in which uncertainty is the only certain thing.”3 
Indeed, centuries have passed since Sun Tzu’s and von Clausewitz’s works were written, 
                                                          
1
 Tzu, S. Art of War, translated by John Minford (London; New York : Penguin Books, 2002), p. 84. 
2
 Clausewitz, C. On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. (Princeton : Princeton 
University Press, 1989), p. 116. 
3
 Handel, M. “Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise”, in Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: essays in 
honor of Michael I. Handel, edited by Richard K. Betts and Thomas G. Mahnken. (Portland, OR ; London: Frank Cass, 
2003), p. 8. 
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nonetheless, the history of intelligence ascertains that, “this state of affairs is the norm rather 
than the exception,” because neither the nature of the intelligence profession, nor the essence 
of information has changed in any fundamental way. Despite the technological revolution over 
the past two centuries, the nature of intelligence remains unchanged. Henceforth, “uncertainty 
remains as prominent factor as ever.” 4  Therefore, Betts’s generalizations that, “Powerful 
nation are not immune to calamity,” and “Military disasters befall some states, no matter how 
informed their leaders are, “ 5seem indeed striking with their analytical validity. 
 Ergo, the reason why uncertainty is still a prominent factor and the nature of intelligence 
remains unalterable is the number of “inherent enemies” of intelligence, “which grow out of 
the human condition and the dynamics of the intelligence function.”6   
It appears analytically plausible to theorize that the regularity in the occurrences of intelligence 
failures, where an intelligence failure equals, “the inability of one or more parts of the 
intelligence process- collection, evaluation and analysis, production, dissemination to produce 
timely, accurate intelligence on an issues or event of importance to national interest,”7 is 
maintained by multifarious, endemic and very often, self-reinforcing, analytical obstacles, which 
hinder or distort the analytical accuracy and clarity of the intelligence process, and erode the 
warning-response process.  As Jackson has noted, it is feasible “…to consider the permanent 
challenges to effective intelligence…in terms of interdependent categories of limitations linked 
                                                          
4
 Jackson, P. “On uncertainty and the limits of intelligence”, in The Oxford Handbook of National Security 
Intelligence (Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 453. 
5
 Betts, R. “Analysis, War, and Decision: why intelligence failures are inevitable”, in Intelligence and National 
Security: the secret world of spies: an anthology, edited with introductions by Loch K. Johnson, James J. Wirtz. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 122.  
6
 Betts, R. Enemies of Intelligence: knowledge and power in American national security  (New York : Columbia 
University Press , 2007), p. 12. 
7
 Lowenthal, M., M. “ The Burdensome Concept of Intelligence Failure”, in Intelligence: policy and process, edited 
by Maurer, A. C., Tunstall, M. D.,  Keagle, J. M. (Boulder : Westview Press, 1985), p. 51. 
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directly to the nature of intelligence as element of politics.”8 From this perspective, it is appears 
logical to foster the deduction that, “intelligence failures are rarely unidimensional in scope.”9 
Per contra, as Bar-Joseph and Jack Levy have systematized, “most intelligence failures are the 
product of the interaction of multiple factors at different levels. These relationships between 
factors are complex and context dependent….”10Ita vero, the “enemies of intelligence” are 
numerous; however, this project will analyze the ones, which are considered most 
fundamentally important and most damaging to the clarity of the intelligence, policy-making 
and the warning-response processes. 
The first and fundamental barrier is the human nature, specifically, the inherent pathologies 
and limitations of the human cognition. As Betts declares, “Among the inherent enemies of 
intelligence are the physical limitations of the cognition process.”11 Following this line of 
thought, according to Michael Handel, “…intelligence work, despite its access to electronic 
monitoring equipment, high-powered computers and satellites…is still based upon a human 
factor.” Henceforth, intelligence work fundamentally reflects human nature.12 And human 
nature, concretely, the human cognition, is constrained, because the physiology of the human 
perception, memory and brain, “even at best apprehend information in ways that are limited 
and distorted.”13 Henceforth, at the core of the inevitability of failure are “the limits of the 
                                                          
8
 Jackson, P. “On uncertainty and the limits of intelligence”, p. 454. 
9
 Lefebvre, St. “A Look at Intelligence Analysis”, International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence, 
vol.17, no. 2, (2004), p. 233. 
10
 Bar-Joseph, U., Levy, J. S. “Conscious Action and Intelligence Failure”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 124, No. 3, 
(2009), p. 476. 
11
 Betts, R. Enemies of intelligence: knowledge and power in American national security, p. 12. 
12
 Handel, M. “Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise”, p. 7. 
13
 Betts, R. Enemies of intelligence : knowledge and power in American national security, p. 12; Heuer, R. J. 
Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence 
Agency, 1999); Jackson, P. “ On uncertainty and the limits of intelligence”, p. 457. 
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human cognition that constrain our ability to anticipate the unexpected or novel, especially if 
the future fails to match our existing analytical concepts.”14  
The second obstacle concerns the cerebral nature of the intelligence work, namely, predicting 
future events or the behavior of respective actors.  “ A forecast,” as Doran postulates, “ is a 
prediction based on knowledge of past behavior,”15 and many intelligence analysts, as Stephen 
Marrin ascertains: ”… use intuitive pattern and trend analysis- consisting of the identification of 
repeated behavior over time and increases or decreases in that behavior- to uncover changes in 
some aspects of international behavior that could have national security implications.”16 
However, from epistemological perspective, as David Hume criticizes this modus operandi, “In 
reality, all arguments from experience are founded on the similarity which we discover among 
natural objects, and by which we are induced to expect effects similar to those which we have 
found to follow from such objects.”17 Henceforth, what is analytically problematic is that, “all 
inferences from experience are effects of customs, not of reasoning.” In effect, this “renders 
our experience useful to use,” and establishes the anticipation of “…similar train of events with 
those which have appeared in the past.”18  
From another perspective, time and space also represent fundamental barriers to analytical 
accuracy. As Austin has postulated, “the world is a fluid, unpredictable, dynamic place.”19 Ergo, 
                                                          
14
 Wirtz, J. “Theory of Surprise”, in Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: essays in honor of Michael I. Handel, edited 
by Richard K. Betts and Thomas G. Mahnken. (Portland, OR; London: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 101. 
15
 Doran, Ch. “Why Forecasts Fail: the limits and potential of forecasting”, International Studies Review, vol. 1, no.2 
(1999), p. 11. 
16
 Marrin, St.  “Homeland Security and the Analysis of Foreign Intelligence”, paper written for the Markle 
Foundation Task Force on National Security and the Information Age, July 15
th
, 2002, p. 8. 
17
 http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/hume/enquiry.pdf  
18
 http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/hume/enquiry.pdf  
19
 Austin, J. “The Psychological Dimension of Intelligence Activities”, in Intelligence: Policy and Process, edited by 
Alfred C. Maurer, Marion D. Tunstall, and James M. Keagle. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p. 200. 
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according to Jackson, “the problems of time and space impose inescapable limitations on 
decision of all kind,”20 because “very often both data and policy outpace analysis.21 Haste, 
therefore, is “the common source of compromise in the quality of intelligence.”22   
The inherent ambiguity of information, which stems “just as often from an excess as a lack of 
information,”23and its excess nowadays24 are also essential factors which reveal the ambivalent 
nature of information and the implication that it poses to the clarity of the analytical process. 
As the Schlesinger report asserted, “In a world of perfect information, there would be no 
uncertainties about the present and future intentions, capabilities, and activities of foreign 
powers. Information, however, is bound to be imperfect for the most part.”25 From another 
perspective, politicization as well poses a significant threat to the accuracy of the intelligence 
cycle, as the possibility that intelligence information will be distorted by ideological bias from 
“top-down” or” bottom-up” is  present at every stage of the intelligence process.26 Lastly, when 
there is a problem with the intelligence process, a great majority of officials would hold the 
conviction that what is needed is to “shake the system up”, “set it right”, and other failures 
                                                          
20
 Jackson, P. “On uncertainty and the limits of intelligence”, p. 454. 
21
 Betts, R. “Analysis, War, and Decision: why intelligence failures are inevitable”, p. 125. 
22
 Jackson, P. “On uncertainty and the limits of intelligence”, p. 454; Grabo, C., M. Anticipating Surprise: analysis for 
strategic warning (Lanham: University Press of America, 2004), pp. 109-12; Betts, R. “The Politicization of 
Intelligence: costs and benefits”, in Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: essays in honor of Michael I. Handel, edited 
by Richard K. Betts and Thomas G. Mahnken. (Portland, OR; London: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 63; Jervis, R. “Reports, 
Politics and Intelligence Failures: the case of Iraq”, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1, (February, 2006), 
pp. 14-15. 
23
 Betts, R. Enemies of intelligence: knowledge and power in American national security, p. 30. 
24
 The Silberman-Robb Commission, “WMD intelligence failure”, in Intelligence and National Security: the secret 
world of spies: an anthology, edited with introductions by Loch K. Johnson, James J. Wirtz. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), p.  465; A Review of the Intelligence Community, March 10, 1971, (the Schlesinger Report), 
p. 10; David, C. M. Wilderness of Mirrors (New York: Random House, 1980), pp. 76-90; Dupont, A. “Intelligence for 
the Twenty-First Century”, Intelligence and National Security, vol. 18, no. 4. (2003), pp. 17-19. 
25
 A Review of the Intelligence Community, March 10, 1971, (the Schlesinger Report), p. 10. 
26
 Jackson, P. “On uncertainty and the limits of intelligence”, p. 459. 
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would be prevented. As Betts posits, “This is illusory. Intelligence can be improved marginally, 
but not radically.”27  
As a result, as Handel has averred, “the route from collection to decision is punctuated” by 
these endemic, analytical barriers.28 Correlatively therefore, it seems indeed plausible to 
generalize that intelligence failures “are rarely a problem of collection, but generally of 
interpretation.”29 Consequently, it appears analytically verisimilar to formulate the 
systematization that in the present as well as in the future both intelligence professionals and 
leaders will continue to operate in “an environment of uncertainty, where the levels of 
uncertainty are liable to increase in direct proportionality to the importance of issues at 
stake.”30  
 
Indeed, the majority of scholars and students of the problem of intelligence failures appear to 
support the aforementioned thesis .Nonetheless, it is worth noting that there is a number of 
scholars that do not concur with the mainstream academic view and argue that intelligence 
debacles are avoidable, as they are a problem of collection. According to Ariel Levite, poor 
collection triggers a process that fosters the intelligence failure.31 Likewise, David Kahn’s 
chapter “United States views of Germany and Japan in 1941” in Earnest May’s “Knowing One’s 
Enemies: intelligence assessment before the Two World Wars” states that, “not one intercept, 
                                                          
27
 Betts, R. Enemies of intelligence: knowledge and power in American national security, p. 20. 
28
 Handel, M. “Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise”, p. 8. 
29
 Brady, Chr. “Intelligence failures: plus ca change…” Intelligence and National Security, vol. 8, no. 4 (1993), pp. 86-
87; Kuhns, W. “Intelligence Failures: Forecasting and the Lessons of Epistemology’, in Paradoxes of Strategic 
Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel, edited by Betts, R. and Thomas G. Mahnken (London: Frank Cass 
2003), p. 81. 
30
 Jackson, P. “On uncertainty and the limits of intelligence”, p. 454. 
31
 Levite, A. Intelligence and Strategic Surprises (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987). 
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not one datum of intelligence ever said anything about an attack on Pearl Harbor or other 
possession.”32 Similarly, Alex Hybel also theorizes and supports the position that intelligence 
failures can be caused by insufficient information.33  On the other hand, Sundri Khalsa has 
developed a computerized methodology, which provides indications and warnings, and thus, 
helps counter-terrorist analysts gather, manage and preoritize information. By utilizing this 
computer program which, inter alia, tracks and displays the task of each analyst, aids analysts in 
identifying relevant information, publishes an intelligence collection plan and sorts collected 
information, Khalsa argues that intelligence debacles can be avoided.34 
Essentially therefore, it would be the principal aim of this project to prove clearly that the 
dependent variable in this case-the problem of intelligence failure, is inevitable and 
unavoidable, despite the structured or non-structured, intuitive methods which intelligence 
analysts frequently use to manage the problem of uncertainty. 35  In order to achieve and evince 
this, the project would employ an atomistic approach, which would allow each one of the 
aforementioned barriers, or independent variables, to be analyzed and studied. 36 This is the 
reason why a causal-theoretical framework would be developed in the first part of the project, 
which by examining the essence and functions of the factors in question, would demonstrate 
their unavoidable, permanent and negative effects towards the intelligence, warning-response 
                                                          
32
 Kahn, D. “United States views of Germany and Japan in 1941”, in Knowing One's Enemies: intelligence 
assessment before the Two World Wars, edited by Ernest R. May (Princeton, N.J.; Guildford: Princeton University 
Press, 1984), p. 500.   
33
 Hybel, A., R. The logic of Surprise in International Conflict (Lexington: Lexington books, 1986), p. 100. 
34
 http://www.sumobrain.com/patents/wipo/System-method-providing-terrorism-
intelligence/WO2008002332.html  
35
 Folker, R. D. „Intelligence Analysis in Theater Joint Intelligence Centers: An Experiment in Applying Structured 
Methods”, Occasional Paper, no. 7, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Military Intelligence College, January, 2000), pp. 6-10.   
36
 Shively, W. The Craft of Political Research (Upper Saddle River, N.J ; London : Prentice Hall, 1998), p. 13.  
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and policy-formulating processes. This causal-theoretical framework would then be employed 
in order to provide concise and consistent explanatory format, concerning the intelligence 
failure of Yom Kippur in 1973. It must be noted that the case of Yom Kippur was chosen to be 
analyzed, because in contrast to classic case-studies such as Pearl Harbor (1941), the Israelis 
knew the Arab attack plans, military deployments, and the intention to launch a war. Moreover, 
unlike the failure of Barbarossa (1941), where a skillful German deception was present, the 
Syrian and Egyptian deception plans were rather primitive.37 Yom Kippur is also an excellent 
example to test the validity of the thesis, because of the fact that the people involved in this 
debacle were very experienced intelligence officers, and hardly any conspiracy theories such as 
the ones surrounding Pearl Harbor or Barbarossa, exist.38 
Methodologically, it is important to be noted that this project will employ a composite 
qualitative method of research, which will borrow heavily from the Orthodox approach, and 
would rely both on primary and secondary sources. Given the dichotomy between the 
Orthodox and the Revisionist approaches on the subject of intelligence failures, the Orthodox 
approach has been chosen to be employed, because of its analytical consistency with and 
relevance to the thesis of the project. As Betts summarizes the Orthodox perspective: “while 
many sources of surprise lie in the attacker’s skills in deception…Orthodox studies emphasize 
the victim’s mistakes- how interactions of organizations, psychology, and inherent ambiguities 
of information create pathologies in the process of absorbing and reacting to indicators.” 39 It 
                                                          
37
 Bar-Joseph, U. The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and Its Sources ( New York: State 
University of New York Press, 2005), p. 2. 
38
 Ibid, pp. 3-4. 
39
 Betts, R. “Surprise, Scholasticism, and Strategy: A Review of Ariel Levite's Intelligence and Strategic Surprises”, 
International Studies Quarterly, vol. 33, no.3 (September, 1989), p.  330. 
 
14 
 
must be noted also that, as the pillars of grounded theory suggest, a priori the analysis of the 
Yom Kippur intelligence failure envelopes, the majority of theoretical segments and arguments 
would be tested against historical data in order to test their validity.40 
Henceforth, the reminder of this project will be organized in four chapters. The first chapter will 
incorporate the relevant literature and research, conducted in the fields of experimental 
psychology in order to examine the most essential, endemic fallibilities of the human cognition. 
The second chapter will utilize David Hume’s rationale to discuss and problematize from 
epistemological perspective the process of making predictions by employing the method of 
induction and past experience. The third chapter will combine several essential factors and will 
analyze the ramifications to the intelligence cycle, induced by the time and space dynamics, the 
problem of politicization, the inherent ambiguity of information and its excess nowadays, and 
the difficulty of reforming intelligence agencies. The last section will explain the intelligence 
failures behind the Yom Kippur War. Due to the format of this project, a historiographical 
approach providing an extensive summary of the event will not be done. The case-study is well-
know, thus, no lengthy introductions would take place.  
 
 
 
                                                          
40
 Glaser, G. G., Straus, L. A. The Discovery of Grounded Theory: strategies for Qualitative Research. (Chicago: 
Aldine Publishing Company, 1967), p. 6; Denscombe, M. The Good Research Guide: for small-scale social research 
projects (Maidenhead : Open University Press, 2007), p. 215. 
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Chapter 1 
The human cognition and its physical limitations 
According to Fischer, “the ideal type of intelligence analyst would be a person who would 
consciously accept information of any kind, accurately assess its quality without any prejudices 
or biases, and capable of differentiating the important information from the ‘noise’ or a 
possible deception.” Unfortunately, Fisher’s ideal analyst model is without empirical referent.41 
The reason for this lies in Sir Francis Bacon’s words that, “…the mind… is far from being a flat, 
equal and clear mirror that receives and reflects the rays without mixture, but is rather…an 
uneven mirror which impacts its own properties to different objects…and distorts and 
disfigures them.”42 Indeed, therefore, “Objectivity”, as Michael Herman points out, “is itself an 
elusive ideal.”43 An additional reason lies in Betts’s assertion that, “knowledge does not speak 
for itself.”44 Henceforth, as James Austin has systematized, “The mere collection of facts cannot 
provide answers to the most important questions. Only the piecing together of facts can do 
that. Such piecing together is at its heart reasoning, and reasoning presupposes psychology.”45 
From psychological perspective, nonetheless, “there are evident restrictions in our ability to 
                                                          
41
 Fischer, B. “Perception, Intelligence Errors and the Cuban Missile Crisis”, in Intelligence and the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, edited by Blight, J and Welch, D. (London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1998), p. 151. 
42
 Sir Francis Bacon quoted in Campbell, D. T. “Systematic Error on the Part of Human Links in Communication 
Systems”, Information and Control, vol. 1, no. 4. (1958), p. 338. 
43
 Herman, M. “11 September: Legitimizing intelligence?”, International Relations, vol. 16, no. 2 (August, 2002), p. 
230.  
44
 Betts, R. Enemies of intelligence: knowledge and power in American national security, p. 12. 
45
 Austin, J. “The Psychological Dimension of Intelligence Activities”, p.  201.  
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comprehend the social world.”46 Ergo, at the core of the inevitability of failures is “the limits of 
the human cognition that constrain our ability to anticipate the unexpected or novel, especially 
if the future fails to match our existing analytical concepts.”47  
It is important to be understood that the academic discipline of psychology has not been able 
to provide a consensus on a single theory that could explain human behavior, especially the 
behavior of individuals, involved into the intelligence profession. Henceforth, there is an 
ongoing debate among Personality Theories, 48  Theories of Social Psychology and Cognitive 
Theories, concerning which approach holds most analytical validity.49 Because the purpose of 
this project is to explain the behavior of intelligence analysts and policy-formulators, the author 
believes that Cognitive theories seem most suitable in explaining the psychological problems of 
intelligence work, because they emphasize the internal processes of perception and reasoning 
and presume that all individuals reason by means of systematic mental processes. At the same 
time, most Cognitive theories focus on the effects of situational context on individual 
reasoning.50 
 
 
 
                                                          
46
 Jackson, P. “On uncertainty and the limits of intelligence”, p. 457; Betts, R. Enemies of intelligence: knowledge 
and power in American national security, p. 12; Heuer, R. J. Psychology of intelligence analysis (Washington, D.C.: 
Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1999). 
47
 Wirtz, J. “Theory of Surprise”, p.101. 
48
 Mischel, W. Personality and Assessment (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1968); Mischel, W. “Toward a Cognitive 
Social Learning Reconceptualization of Personality”, Psychological Review, vol. 80, no.4, (July, 1973), pp. 252-283. 
49
 Austin, J. “The psychological dimension of intelligence activities”, p.  202. 
50
 Loc. cit.  
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The necessity and perils of theory-driven thinking 
According to a large body of psychologists, human beings most often verify information by 
engaging in theory-driven reasoning. Theory-driven processing is a method of interpreting data 
on the basis of a priori acquired beliefs or knowledge. The process commences with a general 
assumption, which functions as a logical filter and a prism for interpreting new information. 
According to cognitive psychologists, the reason why human beings engage in theory-driven 
reasoning can be explained by the necessity of people to preserve mental energy, and the fact 
that this method requires less mental effort,51 as under routine conditions, “memory 
mechanisms reinforce particular channels in the brain.”52 Accordingly, for the purpose of 
understanding the complex human environment, the brain develops a matrix of concepts, 
preconceptions, assumptions, logical expectations and consequences, whose relationship to 
one another enables the brain to “impose order to its external environment.”53 As Jervis has 
noted, “intelligent decision-making in any sphere is impossible unless significant amounts of 
information are assimilated to pre-existing beliefs. Expectations or perceptual sets represent 
standing estimates of what the world is and therefore, of what the person is likely to be 
confronted within everyday life.”54 As a result, the belief-systems actually condition and 
determine how the respective human being comprehends and perceives his or her own 
                                                          
51
 Fischer, B. op. cit., p. 151. 
52
 Fischer, B. op. cit., p. 152; Betts, R. Enemies of intelligence: knowledge and power in American national security, 
p. 59. 
53
 Jackson, P. “On uncertainty and the limits of intelligence”, p. 457. 
54
 Jervis, R. Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.; Chichester: Princeton University 
Press, 1976), p. 146. 
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external environment. Ergo, it is analytically plausible to theorize that the function of theory-
driven thinking is a form of “reductive coding.”55   
Following this line of reasoning, a study, developed for the US Army Research Institute and the 
US Army Intelligence and Security Command, concluded that “intelligence is conceptually-
driven” activity, which means that, “What is critical is not just the data collected, but also what 
is added to those data in interpreting them via conceptual models in the analyst’s store of 
knowledge,”56 as  “the data that is received by analysts, is filtered, selected and evaluated 
usually according to memory-shared conceptual models of types of real-world objects or 
events, thought to have generated the data being interpreted.”57 As Heuer asserts, “once 
people have started thinking about a problem one way, the same mental pathways or circuits 
get activated and strengthened each time they think about it. This facilitates retrieval of 
information.”58  
However, what is problematic is that theory-driven processing influences the way in which 
ambiguous information is comprehended. Concretely, very often ambivalent data is interpreted 
in a manner that supports certain prior knowledge.59 Mark Lowenthal provides a very good 
example: “Given a choice between appearing jaded or naïve on a given subject, the average 
intelligence professional will choose to appear jaded…Few situations are treated as being truly 
                                                          
55
 Campbell, T. D. “Systematic Error on the Part of Human Links in Communication Systems”, Information and 
Control, vol.1, no. 4 (1958), p. 337. 
56
 Katter, R. V., Montgomery, C., A., Thompson, J., R.  “Human Processes in Intelligence Analysis: phase 1: 
overview”, Research Report 1237 (Woodland Hills, CA: Operating Systems Inc. December, 1979), pp. 1-10. 
57
Ibid, pp. 3-5. 
58
 Heuer, R. J. op. cit., p. 21. 
59
 Fischer, B. op. cit., p. 153; Fiske, S. Taylor, Sh. Social Cognition (New York : McGraw-Hill, 1991), pp. 257-265. 
 
19 
 
new.”60 Similarly, in another study subjects were divided into two groups and shown a series of 
slides. The slides of the first group included positive subliminal words such as “brave” and 
“adventurous. “ The slides of the second group included negative subliminal words such as 
“reckless” and “dangerous.”  The groups then were shown pictures of people shooting rapids in 
a canoe, and asked to assess the scenario. The subjects that had been exposed to negative 
subliminal phrases were far more likely to assess the scenario in negative manner and to 
conclude that the canoeists were acting irresponsibly, whereas subjects who had been exposed 
to the positive subliminal phrases were more likely to assess the scenario positively- in their 
view “the canoeists were having fun.”61 Therefore, this kind of processing may undermine the 
ability to reorganize the information mentally so to generate alternative perspective or 
interpretation of the data,62 because the body of concepts and theories that set the framework 
for research constitutes a paradigm and the paradigm sets limits on what explanations are 
acceptable, and helps determine which phenomena are important and which are to be 
ignored.63  
Furthermore, another implication which may hinder the accuracy of the intelligence analysis is 
the tendency that, “…the more familiar a phenomenon is the more quickly it will be recognized. 
Less evidence is needed for a person to recognize a common object than an unusual one. Rare 
objects are mistaken for usual ones. And expected things may be seen when actually nothing is 
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being shown.”64 To illustrate this, in one experiment a person is shown two balloons, one of 
which is being inflated and the other is being deflated. However, the observer sees the balloons 
as staying the same sized, explaining the perceived change in size as being caused by motion 
towards or away from the observer. The most reasonable explanation of this visual 
phenomenon seems to be that the observer unconsciously related to the stimulus pattern 
some sort of weighted average of the past correlations between the stimulus and the identity 
of the object. The observer sees the balloons moving because it is rare indeed to see two 
stationary objects at the same distance, one growing larger and the other smaller. “Almost 
always, in everyday life when we see two identical or nearly identical objects change relative 
size, they are in motion relation to each other.”65 
What is more, another ramification from theory-driven processing is that people can observe 
exactly the same behavior, yet interpret it in a completely different ways, as people with 
different belief may attach different meaning to the same information.66  Franz From provides a 
good example-one young lady  was walking and “saw Professor X, whom she dislikes, walk on 
the pavement in front of her and in the same direction as she was going, and she thought: ‘This 
man does walk in a very theatrical and pompous fashion; he clearly thinks very highly of 
himself.’ When she got a little closer to the man, she saw that it was not at all Professor X, but 
her beloved teacher, Doctor Y, whom she thought was not rated accordingly to his desserts 
because of his humility. And now, walking behind Doctor Y, she thought: ‘This man’s whole 
                                                          
64
 Jervis, R. Perception and Misperception in International Politics, p. 147. 
65
 Goldiamong, Isr., Hawkins, W. “Vexierversuch: The log relationship between word-frequency and recognition 
obtained in the absence of stimulus words”, Journal of Experimental Psychology, vol. 56, no. 6, (1958) pp. 457-63; 
Ittelson, W. H., Kilpatrick, F. P. “Experiments in Perception”, Scientific American, vol.185, no.2, (1951), pp. 52-54. 
66
 Fischer, B. op. cit., p. 153; Heuer, R. J. op. cit., p. 21 
 
21 
 
appearance shows his humility, his walk is so straight forward and humble.”The same person 
had made two considerably different impressions on her.67 
Ultimately, however, this theory-driven processing is inevitable part of theory-building. As Kelly 
argues, “man looks at his world through transparent patterns or templates, which he creates 
and then attempts to fit over the realities of which the world is composed. The fit is not always 
very good. Yet, without such patterns the world appears to be such an undifferentiated 
homogeneity that man is unable to make any sense of it. Even a poor fit is more helpful than 
nothing at all.”68 Similarly, Heuer states: “People have no conceivable way of coping with the 
volume of stimuli that impinge upon their senses, or with the volume and complexity of the 
data they have to analyze, without some kind of simplifying preconceptions about what to 
expect, what is important, and what is related to what.”69 
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Hypothesis-confirmation bias 
 
Kenneth Waltz has asserted that, “our minds cannot record and make something of all the 
many things that in some sense we see. We are, therefore, inclined to see what we are looking 
for, to find what our sense of the causes of things leads to believe are significant.”70 This 
“human tendency,” as Evans has noted, “to notice and to look for information that confirms 
one’s beliefs, and to ignore, not look for, or undervalue the relevance of information that 
contradicts it, is the most known bias.”71 Henceforth, once certain systems of beliefs and 
conceptions have been established through theory-driven reasoning, they are maintained and 
reinforced through “the tendency of individuals to select evidence that supports rather than 
refutes a given hypothesis”72  
For example, “one group of subjects was shown a series of numbers and the other a series of 
letters. Both groups were then exposed to the ambiguous stimulus of a symbol 13, or a “broken 
B.” Those who had previously looked at numbers saw the number 13. On the other hand, those 
who had previously seen letters saw a “B.”73 The results of the experiment concur with Fischer’s 
observation, that individuals not only will  pay more attention to evidence that confirms their 
conceptions, but they will also demonstrate an inclination to actively seek out such 
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information, which in effect  will verify and consolidate a person’s initial core-beliefs.74 In 
another experiment, subjects watched 2 people play a competitive game. One player took his 
moves rapidly and decisively, whiles the other- slowly and deliberately. When the former won, 
he was seen more as a quick thinker than impulsive, more intuitive than careless. The opposite 
was true when he lost. When the latter won, “he was perceived… as more deliberate than 
sluggish, and more attentive than uncomprehending. The opposite impressions were formed 
when he lost. Apparently, without being aware, the subjects were striving to achieve 
consistency with their established assumptions.”75 Henceforth, as Karl Popper has postulated, 
“it is easy to obtain confirmation, or verifications, for nearly every theory- if we look for 
confirmation.”76 
According to Jackson, “The minds of analysts are unexceptional in this regard. They are also 
inclined to search for, and seize upon, cognitive consonance which will confirm existing beliefs 
and desires, and hence reinforce them.” 77 This, nevertheless, may pose certain serious dangers 
for the accuracy of the intelligence process. For example, in a recent study, conducted after 
9/11 by Rob Johnson, analysts were asked to provide an account of the work processes they 
employed to produce answers to questions, explain occurrences and make forecasts. What is 
problematic for intelligence accuracy is that the process they described commenced with an 
inquiry of the previous analytical products, developed by their agency. Evidently, this was being 
done for the purpose of establishing an analytical baseline from which analysts begin 
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constructing and developing their own analysis. Similarly, as one analyst testifies:” When a 
request comes in from a consumer to answer some question, the first thing to do is to read up 
on the analytic line- check the previous publications and sort through the current traffic. I have 
looked at our previous products, and I have got a good idea of the pattern; so, when I sort 
through the traffic, I know what I am trying to find.”78 Heuer provides a similar 
example:”experienced analysts do not try to connect dots on a tabula rasa, especially when 
there is a wealth of data that can be sorted in various ways; instead of a picture emerging from 
putting all the pieces together, analysts typically form a picture first and then select the pieces 
to fit it.”79   
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Cognitive dissonance and Lay-epistemic theory  
In his magnum opus, Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Leon Fistinger made the observation that 
once an individual has established certain systems of beliefs, he or she will strive “toward 
consistency within himself,” and would try to maintain consonance between what the 
individual “knows or believes and what he does.”80 However, as Fistinger writes, “very few 
things are all black or all white; very few situations are clear-cut enough so opinions or 
behaviors are not so some extent a mixture of contradictions.”81 The existence of such 
psychologically uncomfortable disequilibrium within the cognition of an individual,”…will 
motivate the person to try to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance.” 82 Furthermore, 
“when dissonance is present, in addition to trying to reduce it, the person will actively avoid 
situations and information which would likely increase the dissonance.”83  To illustrate this it is 
worth pondering upon Fistinger’s “hypothetical smoker” analogy. Namely, when a smoker is 
confronted with the fact that smoking is very unhealthy, he or she would either have to change 
this dangerous habit, or to adjust the information, which is producing the dissonance. Most 
often the latter is undertaken. Specifically, “the hypothetical smoker may find that the process 
of giving up smoking is too painful for him to endure. He might try to find facts and opinions of 
other to support the view that smoking is not harmful. He might even remain in the position 
where he continues to smoke and is aware that smoking is unhealthy.”84 Henceforth, “cognitive 
dissonance can be seen as antecedent condition which leads to activity orientated towards 
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dissonance reduction just as hunger leads to activity orientated towards hunger reduction. It is 
very difficult motivation, nonetheless powerful. “85 Osgood and Tannenbaum’s study on 
psychological congruity appears to validate Fistinger’s logic. Namely, Osgood and Tannenbaum 
documented a study of opinions and attitudes in respect of the principle of consonance. They 
have theorized that, “changes in evaluation are always in direction of increased congruity with 
the existing frame and reference.”86 In their study, incongruity or dissonance is produced by the 
knowledge that a person or other source of information which a subject regards positively/ 
negatively supports an opinion which the subject regards on the opposite- negatively/ 
positively. They demonstrated that under such circumstances, a tendency exist to change either 
the evaluation of the opinion involved or the evaluation of the source in a direction which 
would decrease the inconsistency within the individual. Therefore, “if the source was positively 
evaluated and the opinion- negatively, the subject may end up reacting less positively to the 
source and more positively to the opinion.87 “The important point”, as Fistinger writes, “is that 
there is a pressure to produce consonant relation among cognitions and to avoid, and reduce 
dissonance.”88 
Similarly, when the chemist, Otto Hahn found lighter elements and not heavier ones, after 
bombardment of the Uranium nucleus, he admitted being, “extremely reluctant to announce as 
a new discovery a result that did not conform to existing ideas.” He could not accept an 
associate’s claim that the only explanation could be fission because, “this conclusion violated all 
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previous experiences in the field of physics.”89 In a like manner, the astronomers Lalande 
decided not to further investigate the planet Neptune because his observations were opposing 
the prevailing theories of that time.90 Another example is a meeting between General Galland 
and Goering, where the former reported to the latter that several American fighter planes, 
accompanying bomber squadrons, had been shot down over Aachen. When Goering was 
informed, he refused to believe Galland and responded: "Come now, Galland, let me tell you 
something. I am an experienced fighter pilot myself. I know what is possible. But I know what is 
not, too. "91 
Very closely related to the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance is Lay-epistemic theory. 
Fistinger himself has postulated that when dissonance is eliminated, and the cognitive elements 
are in consonance with the systems of beliefs, a “freezing effect” would occur.92 According to 
one of the greatest advocate and proponent of Lay-epistemic theory and the concept of the 
Epistemic process, Arie Kruglanski, the Epistemic Process starts with a question that the 
individual has on a certain topic of interest, in order to find an appropriate answer, he or she 
generates an number of hypothesis and test their validity through collection and analysis of 
relevant information. As aforementioned, the testing of the validity of certain hypothesis would 
be effected by the theory-driven reasoning, the hypothesis-confirmation bias and the cognitive 
dissonance. Henceforth, when concluded that a logical consistency between the available 
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information and a specific hypothesis has been reached, the human tendency is to stop looking 
for additional answers. This ends the Epistemic process-a situation termed by Kruglanski as 
“epistemic freezing.”93  “Once a given conception has been ‘frozen’, denial and reinterpretation 
of inconsistent information in terms that match one's prior conception, have been observed, as 
well.”94 Following this line of thinking, the epistemic process and the “freezing” of a respective 
estimation, can easily lead to Pollyana syndrome, which is characterized by over-confidence in 
the validity of one’s own abilities and assumptions.95 
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Chapter 2 
The Epistemological problem of predictions  
According to Doran, “A forecast is a prediction based on knowledge of past behavior,”96 and in 
the opinion of George N. Sibley, “the nature of political action requires an ability to forecast 
future events.”97  In the field of intelligence analysis, this task is done by engaging either in 
structured, systemic or in nonstructured, intuitive approaches. Due to the facts that intelligence 
analysis has qualitative nature, and as such, it „ deals with an infinite number of variables that 
are impossible to operationalize because they cannot be adequately quantified or fully 
collected”, and „because in many cases the variables are so complex, countless, and 
incomplete, attempting to analyze them using scientific methods is pseudo-science,” a great 
deal of intelligence analysts would engage in inductive approach, “in which powers of pattern 
recognition are enhanced and intuition is elevated.” 98 According to Gary Klein,specialist in 
pattern recognition, systemic approaches „in practice ...are often disappointing. They do not 
work under time pressure because they take too long.  Even when there is enough time, they 
require much work and lack flexibility for handling rapidly changing field conditions.”99 
Therefore,  the operational rationale behind employing nonstructured approaches dictates that 
since intelligence analysis is based on instict, education, and experience, engaging in such 
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inductive and  intuitive methods may lead to more usefull and creative analysis.100  Stephen 
Marrin  corroborates this logic, as he writes that analysts ”…use intuitive pattern and trend 
analysis- consisting of the identification of repeated behavior over time and increases or 
decreases in that behavior- to uncover changes in some aspects of international behavior that 
could have national security implications.”101Mark Kauppi has termed this approach-the “time-
honored element of intelligence analysis.”102 
 Qua definitionem, moving from the particular to the general and moving from the past to the 
future are the two most common forms of inductive reasoning. 103  Therefore, taking into 
account Rescher’s assumption that, “every rational prediction is an induction,”104 it is plausible 
to assume that very often intelligence professional utilize the method of induction when 
fostering predictions. However, as this chapter will demonstrate, from epistemological 
perspective, predictions has an inherent fallacy, as the method of induction is itself analytically 
problematic, and thus, is one of the fundamental causes of intelligence failures. 
 
Indicative of the induction process and its inherent problem are the following brief examples. A 
number of intelligence analysts are provided with evidence from IMINT, proving that a 
respective state is manifesting certain indications at its nuclear test range. In the past, 
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whenever those certain indicators were present in the respective state, a nuclear test was to 
follow shortly. Ergo, there is a very high probability that the analyst, studying this particular 
occurrence, may conclude inductively that the respective state is again aiming at testing a 
nuclear weapon. The second example is equally important- a number of divisions of a country 
X’s army are observed to possess new artillery weapon. Similarly, inductively, it can be inferred 
that the remaining division of the army of state X, or at least those sharing the same front, are 
to be equipped with the new artillery weapon.105  However, this is not necessarily correct. 
In order to understand the analytical problem of induction and predictions from 
epistemological perspective, it is worth pondering upon David Hume’s question:”What is the 
foundation of all our reasonings and conclusions concerning the relation between cause and 
effect?” As Hume has written, “It may be replied in one word, experience.”106 
 It is precisely experience that makes induction, as a scientific method, analytically indefensible, 
because “all reasoning concerning the matter of facts seems to be founded on relation of Cause 
and Effect,” “where that causes and effects are discoverable, not by reason but by 
experience.”107  It is also necessary to reflect on Hume’s other important question: “What is the 
foundation of all conclusions from experience?” Essentially, Hume has theorized: “… all our 
experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition that the future will be conformable to 
the past. To endeavor, therefore, the proof of this last supposition by probable arguments, or 
arguments regarding existence, must be evidently going in a circle, and taking that for 
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granted…” Henceforth, “From causes which appear similar we expect similar effects. This is the 
sum of all our experimental conclusions.” 108 
 This is the conceptual cornerstone of the epistemological problem of predictions, because 
there is no logical reason to presuppose that a regularity exists which causes past events to 
reoccur again in the future in repeating cycle. As Hume ascertains, “In reality, all arguments 
from experience are founded on the similarity which we discover among natural objects, and by 
which we are induced to expect effects similar to those which we have found to follow from 
such objects.”109 Henceforth, “all inferences from experience are effects of customs, not of 
reasoning …Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone which 
renders our experience useful to use, and makes us expect, for the future a similar train of 
events with those which have appeared in the past.”110   
In a like manner, Charles Dolan suggests that,  predictions in which, “the past is prologue, and 
forecasting amount to linear extrapolations of the past trend into the future” ultimately fail, 
because no technique has been developed that allows the forecaster to predict prior to the 
event itself when a non linearity will occur.111  Or as John Lukacs has systematized, “historical 
causality is not mechanical mostly because of free will. Also, what happens is not separable 
from what people think happens.”112 
Exemplary of the problem of using induction for forecasting is a report made in 1983 by a group 
of senior advisors to the Director of Central Intelligence . The group was to evaluate and assess 
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the quality of intelligence judgment preceding significant historical failures. The conclusions of 
the group illustrated well the weakness of induction, as they observed that in the estimates 
that failed, inter alia the Sino-Soviet Split, the development of the Alpha submarine, the 
Qadhafi takeover in Lybia, the OPEC oil increase, the revolutionary transformation of Ethiopia, 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or the destruction of the Shah’s Iran,  there were a number 
of recurrent common factors which, in retrospect seemed critical to the quality of the analysis. 
The basic problem in each was to recognize qualitative change and to deal with situations in 
which trend continuity and precedent were of marginal, if not counter-productive, value.113 
Nevertheless, according to Rescher, “the key role of prediction in human affairs inheres in our 
stake in the future, for without some degree of cognitive control over the future, we humans 
could not exist as the intelligent creatures we are.”114  Nonetheless, Rescher’s 
conceptualization of the inevitable and indivisible role of predictions from human affairs is 
exactly what constitutes the harsh lesson from Epistemology- intelligence forecasts are close to 
science, but they do not guarantee certainty. As Kuhns argues, “the uniformity of procedures, 
the reference to laws and norms…the principle of empiricism, which dictates that only 
observation and experiment can decide the acceptance or rejection” of a respective claim, 
presuppose respect and reverence.115   However, “even with phenomena governed by 
deterministic equations such as classical physics, there is still room for wholly unpredictable 
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outcomes in certain circumstances.”116  Henceforth, it does seem feasible that analytical 
failures in general are inevitable,117 because there is no way in which predictions can be known 
in advance whether they are affirmative or negative, which in itself implies that there is no way 
in which intelligence failures can be prevented. They are simply inevitable and can be 
conceptualized as a function of the uncertain manner in which knowledge is gained118  in “a 
chaotic world where nothing can be securely predicted because all apparent patterns are at 
best transitory stabilities.”119  As Nicholas Rescher has remarked:”In nature, we have volatility 
and chance (stochastic phenomena); in human affairs-innovation and chance (free will). Chaos 
is a phenomenon that straddles both domains.”120   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
116
Rescher, N. Predicting the Future: an introduction to the theory of forecasting (New York: State University of 
New YorkPress, 1998), p. 143. 
117
 Kuhns, W. “Intelligence Failures: forecasting and the lessons of Epistemology”, p. 97. 
118
 Ibid., pp. 89-93. 
119
 Rescher, N. “ Prediction”, p. 772. 
120
Ibid., p. 752.  
 
35 
 
Chapter 3  
Fundamental obstacles to the analytical accuracy 
 
Time and space variables  
As Austin has generalized, “the world is a fluid, unpredictable, dynamic place.”121 Ergo, as 
Jackson has argued, “the problems of time and space impose inescapable limitations on 
decision of all kind.” Specifically, the need to gather accurate and relevant information, analyze 
it, and then integrate it into decision while it is still useful, has always been one of the most 
difficult challenges in all aspects of human life. The central reason for this is that the social 
world is fluid rather than static. This means that the situation described by any intelligence 
report is liable to change before the relevant information can be analyzed and integrated into 
decision-making process.122 This logic appears to be corroborated by Richard Betts, who himself 
has recognized that often “... both data and policy outpace analysis.” As a result, “the ideal 
process of staffing and consultation falls behind the press of events and careful estimates 
cannot be digested in time.”123 This is particularly well illustrated by one historic episode. 
Namely, as Winston Churchill recalled of the hectic days of spring of 1940: “the Defense 
Committee of the War Cabinet sat almost every day to discuss reports of the Military 
Coordination Committee and those of the Chiefs of Staff; and their conclusions or divergences 
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were again referred to frequent cabinets. All had to be explained or re-explained; and by the 
time this process was completed; the whole scene had often changed.”124 Henceforth, indeed, 
as Jackson writes, “In this sense most intelligence information is “time bound” and it is 
usefulness depends upon the speed at which it can be transmitted and analyzed. 125 Following 
this line of reasoning, a body of both scholars has observed that, “the most common source of 
compromise in the quality of intelligence is haste.”126 
According to Jacksons, “this limitation has always applied more to information on short- and 
medium-term intentions and capabilities than to long-range strategic assessment.”127 
Consequently, the frequent changes in the time and space variables can be theorized to 
consequently reinforce a tendency to focus on “current intelligence” at the expense of 
contextual analysis and medium- to long-range forecasting,”128 which “leaves analysts with little 
time, but also little inclination or ability to look beyond recent cables.”129  
In effect, the requirement for speed presupposes a high probability that very frequently it will 
lead to oversimplification and ill-judgments concerning complex matters. This problem is 
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particularly acute nowadays.130 For example, as Jervis suggests, part of the reason why the 
October 2002, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which stated that Iraq is continuing with its 
Weapons of Mass Destruction program,131 was wrong is because “it was produced with great 
haste.”132 Furthermore, the WMD Commission report reveals a similarity between the October, 
2002 NIE and the format of the Presidential Daily Briefings (PDBs). Namely, the WMD 
Commission “…reviewed a number of articles from the President’s Daily Brief relating to Iraq’s 
WMD programs… We [the WMD Commission] found some flaws that were inherent in the 
format of the PDBs—a series of short “articles” often based on current intelligence reporting 
that are presented to the President each morning. Their brevity leaves little room for doubts or 
nuance—and their ‘headlines’ designed to grab the reader’s attention leave no room at all. 
Also, a daily drumbeat of reports on the same topic gives an impression of confirming evidence, 
even when the reports all come from the same source.”133  
The same problem and its implications have been observed also by the Church Committee: 
“Responding to the growing demand of information of current concern by policy-makers for 
more coverage on more topics, the Directorate of intelligence has of necessity resorted to a 
“current events” approach to much of its research. There is less interest in and fewer resources 
have been devoted to in-depth analysis of problems with long-range importance to policy-
makers. The Directorate has had to devote considerable resources in order to keep up on the 
day-to day basis with events as they happen. To some extent, analysts feel they must compete 
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for timeliness with the considerable amount of raw reporting which reaches consumers. 
According to some observers, this syndrome has had an unfavorable impact on the quality of 
crisis warning and the recognition of longer term trends. The ‘current’ event approach 
syndrome has fostered the problem of ‘incremental analysis’, the tendency to focus myopically 
on the latest piece of information without systematic consideration of an accumulated body of 
integrated evidence. Analysts in their haste to compile the day’s traffic, tend to lose sight of 
underlying factors and relationships.” 134 For example, “the 1966 Cunningham Report points out 
that the CIA’s sinologists were so immersed in the large volume of daily Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service, which monitors foreign open source media, and other source reports on 
Communist China in the early 1960s, that they failed to consider adequately the broader 
question of a slowly developing Soviet-Sino dispute.”135 
To conclude, “the formidable difficulties inherent in estimating short-term intentions will 
remain a central cause of intelligence failures. They are the product of the inescapable 
dynamics of time and space.”136 
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The problem of the inherent ambiguity of information and its quantity 
nowadays 
As the Schlesinger report asserted, “In a world of perfect information, there would be no 
uncertainties about the present and future intentions, capabilities, and activities of foreign 
powers. Information, however, is bound to be imperfect for the most part.”137 On the grounds 
of the Schlesinger report, therefore, “estimating,” as Sherman Kent argues, “is what you do 
when you do not know.” Nonetheless, as Kent put it, “it is inherent in a great many situations 
that after reading the estimate, you will still not know.”138  The reason for this is that “the truth’ 
is not completely evident, although all the facts have been gathered and are known.139  This 
delineates and demonstrates one of the most crucial impediments to the accuracy of the 
intelligence process- the inherent ambiguity and ambivalence of the collected information, 
which stems “just as often from an excess as a lack of information.”140 The implications which 
arise from this obstacles can be perceived as interconnected with and reinforcing the first 
category of cognitive impediments- the psychological pathologies inherent in human nature. 
From this perspective, Richard Jervis has established that, “the greater the ambiguity, the 
greater the impact of preconceptions,” effecting both analysts and policy-makers.141 Similarly, 
Betts theorizes that, “When the problem is an environment that lacks clarity, an overload of 
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conflicting data… ambiguity abets instinct and allows intuition to drive analysis.”142  
“Consequently”, as the Schlesinger report has documented, “the intelligence community can at 
best reduce the uncertainties and construct plausible hypotheses about these factors on the 
basis of what continues to be partial and often conflicting evidence.”143  
However, as the Schlesinger and the Church reports have predicated, there is a theoretically 
problematic assumption that by increasing the collection capabilities of a respective agency, 
and thus, amassing greater quantities of information, ambiguity would be decreased and 
analysis would be improved.144 “This assumption,” as Laqueur has contended, “is itself naïve, 
for it presents an oversimplified picture of how intelligence works.”145 Therefore, following 
Jervis’s ascertainment that, “Information is not necessarily informative,”146 it appears possible 
to ponder upon Austin’s “dilemma of information” and its implications. Concretely, “if one cuts 
back on the amount of information collected, significant facts are more likely to be missed.” On 
the other hand, in order to reduce ambiguity and uncertainty, it is a common practice to seek 
more information in order to fill the gaps in the analysis. Nevertheless, when larger amounts of 
evidence are collected, it is inevitable that, because “noise” surrounds “signals”, more 
ambiguity and confusion would also be picked up. Ergo, there is a very high probability that this 
practice would increase the cost of and the ambiguity in a respective analysis. Henceforth, the 
more collection of evidence increases, the higher probability that the result may be hindering 
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the accuracy of the analysis. Ultimately, “we may actually end up increasing rather than 
decreasing uncertainty.”147 Essentially, the endemic problem is reflected in the Church report’s 
conclusion: “The problem is that increased collection will not always produce better 
analysis.”148  
Nowadays, the excess of information appears to have exacerbated the problem of the inherent 
ambivalence of information, and thus, has further hindered the clarity of the intelligence 
analysis. As the WMD report indicates, “Numerous studies have demonstrated that today 
analysts are overloaded with information. A study published in 1994 revealed that analysts on 
average had to scan 200 to 300 documents in two hours each day, just to discover reports 
worth writing about.”149 Moreover, as the WMD report suggests, if it is assumed that “relevant 
information has doubled for most analytic accounts over the past ten years…and if analysts are 
expected not just to pick reports to write about, but more importantly to ‘connect the dots,’ 
among variables and documents, the typical analyst would need a full workday just to perform 
the basic function of monitoring new data.”150 Likewise, the Schlesinger report has observed 
that, “despite the richness of the data made available by modern methods of collections…it is  
not at all clear that our [American] hypotheses about foreign intentions, capabilities and 
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activities have improved commensurately  in scope and quality as more data comes in the from 
modern collection methods.”151  
Illustrative of the problem of ambiguity and excess of information is the case of CIA’s tap into 
the underground cables in Berlin during Operation Gold. In 1954, the CIA tapped 3 cables used 
by the Soviet Military Intelligence in Berlin. Each cable had 172 circuits and each circuit had a 
minimum of 18 channels. A total of 9, 288 channels were monitored. The amount of 
information was enormous, which made hardly manageable to sift through the miles of tape 
before the space and time variables affect the intelligence product and the intelligence became 
outdated.”The CIA had succeeded in a collection operation only to fall victim to its own 
success.”152  
To conclude, as Dupont has observed, the result is that in the Twenty-First century intelligence 
services operate in a world of more ambiguity and ambivalence of information.153 
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The problem of politicization 
As Jackson has noted, “the identification and interpretation of threats is essentially a political 
activity.” 154 However, “Politicization,” as Betts has observed,”is a complicated phenomenon,” 
as “it can be bad or good.”155 The controversial nature of this factor has generated wide 
debates. As Betts has noted, “Much confusion and rancor about what constitutes politicization 
flows from different models of how the intelligence process should relate to policymaking. 
These might be considered the ‘Kent’ and ‘Gates’ models.”156 The “Kent” Model, named after 
Sherman Kent, is a paradigm, which posits that the relationship between intelligence personnel 
and policy-formulators must be one of great caution, because of the danger of intelligence 
personnel being too close to decision-makers, which would distort the objectivity and 
professional integrity of the former.157 The “Gates” model is located on the other spectrum of 
the debate. The concept, named after Robert Gates, emphasizes that in order for intelligence to 
be more useful, intelligence professionals are be closer to policy-formulating circles in order to 
engage more productively in the concerns of the latter.158  
Despite both models and the norm that policy interests, preferences, or decisions must never 
determine intelligence judgments,159 in reality “the possibility that intelligence information will 
be distorted by ideological bias is present at every stage of the intelligence process. From the 
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outset, political assumptions determine what is considered a threat and what is not. This, in 
turn, conditions what information is gathered and what is deemed important.”160 Ergo, “In one 
sense intelligence cannot live with politicization but policy cannot live without it.”161Yet, being, 
“…a phenomenon that can flow down or up,”162 politicization is one of “the worst thing that can 
happen to intelligence.”163 
 
“Top-down” politicization 
The “top-down” model of politicization is the product of the dynamic relationship between 
intelligence producers and decision-making consumers. This phenomenon is often understood 
as pressure by the latter on the former to produce estimates that conform to pre-existing 
beliefs.164 The magnitude of the pressure may range from “blatant and crude” to “subtle and 
artful.”165 What is generally agreed upon is that, as one CIA analyst revealed, “politicization is 
like fog. Though you cannot hold it in your hands, or nail it to a wall, but it does exist, it is real, 
and it does affect people.”166 More importantly, this type of “politicization is to some degree 
inevitable,” 167 because “For issues of high importance and controversy, any relevant analysis 
will be politically charged, because it will point at least implicitly to a conclusion about policy.” 
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In other words, “The more intelligence matters, the more politicized it will appear to some 
faction in a policy debate.”168  
Particularly illustrative in this respect is the 1967 Vietnam War dispute concerning the estimate 
of Communist military strength in South Vietnam, or as Richard Helms has termed it, “the 
Vietnam numbers game.”169  Specifically, CIA was arguing for higher numbers in the order of 
battle (O/B) estimate and the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) for lower 
numbers.170 Many perceived the MACV’s estimate as intellectually corrupt, and motivated by 
the political need to convince the audiences that “the end comes into view.”171  Military 
personnel involved in the negotiations concerning the order of battle estimate confessed 
privately that the order of battle figure should be higher, but that there had been a command 
decision to keep the number below 300,000,172 because as a cable from General Creighton 
Abrams to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Earle Wheeler suggests, "We have been 
projecting an image of success over the recent months," and the press would draw an 
erroneous and gloomy conclusion....All those who have an incorrect view of the war will be 
reinforced.”173 The distorting dynamic of politicization is further revealed by Rober Komer, the 
highest civilian in the MACV, who is said to have concluded that, “there must not be any 
quantifying of the enemy's irregular forces, on the grounds that doing so 'would produce a 
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politically unacceptable total over 400,000.”174 Further, George Allen quotes Komer as saying: 
"You guys [CIA] simply have to back off. Whatever the true O/B figure is, is beside the point.”175 
Equally importantly is that nowadays, Born and Johnson have asserted that, “an excessive 
politicization of intelligence services may be partially a product of the recent democratization of 
intelligence oversight. The greater the role for parliaments and their oversight committees in 
reviewing intelligence activities may have resulted in an increase in the political and public 
pressures on these agencies. Democratically elected governments can no longer simply refuse 
to comment on intelligence issues, governments are now more forced to use complex media 
strategies to turn over the parliaments and the media to their cause.”176  
 
“Bottom-up” politicization or the “intelligence-to-please” syndrome 
Analytical distortion can often arise from a desire among intelligence officials to increase their 
influence, or at least to avoid marginalization, by producing estimates that complement existing 
policy orientations. To challenge either political or institutional orthodoxies is to run the risk of 
becoming ostracized, which can have negative effect on the career of analysts or intelligence 
managers.177 Similarly, Uri Bar-Joseph and Jack Levy assert that, “Intelligence officers might 
consciously adjust their estimate because they believe that the failure to provide ‘intelligence 
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to please’ might result in their loss of job, the denial of future promotion opportunity, or the 
loss of influence on the future policy decisions.”178  
For example, a CIA task force in the 1990s found that over half of the analysts believed that 
shaping an intelligence assessment to conform to a view that the analyst believed was held by a 
manager “occurs often than enough to be a concern.”179 John Gentry, a CIA intelligence analyst, 
also arrived at a similar conclusion with respect to the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence. He 
argues that since management and review was in the hands of senior supervisors, they could 
enforce the inclusion of their preferences in analyses. As a result, many analysts tried to please 
their bosses by writing what they thought their bosses would like to see, and began focusing on 
quantity rather than quality of production... Shallow analysis and packaging therefore, became 
more important than sound analytical judgment.180 Another very indicative example is 
connected with the Chinese intervention in the Korean War of 1950.  Despite numerous 
indications of Chinese intentions, including military deployments, presence of Chinese soldiers 
south of the Yalu River, General Douglas McArthur’s intelligence chief, Major-General, Charles 
Willoughby assessed that the China would not intervene.181 However, Lieutenant-Colonel, John 
Chiles, Chief of Operations, who fought in Korea, stated: “MacArthur did not want the Chinese 
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to enter the war in Korea. Anything McArthur wanted, Willoughby produced intelligence for…in 
this case Willoughby falsified the intelligence reports.”182  
To conclude, “the various manifestations of politicization in the policy process all flow from the 
basic fact that intelligence is fundamentally a political activity. Consequently, they cannot be 
eradicated. Requiring either producers or consumers to step outside their individual ideological 
perspective would be to demand that they approach intelligence without a frame of reference 
required to comprehend it.”183 As Robert Jervis says, "intelligence is also easier to keep pure 
when it is irrelevant."184 
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The elusiveness of solutions185 
When the inevitable occurs, and “the intelligence system stumbles badly,” in order to prevent 
future intelligence disasters, a majority of officials would “shake the system up,” “set it right,” 
operating on the grounds that if the cause of the failure is understood, the problem would be 
fixed. 186 “This,” as Betts posits, “is illusory,” as “Intelligence can be improved marginally, but 
not radically.” Furthermore, this illusion can also be very dangerous if it inspires overconfidence 
that systemic reforms are to significantly increase the predictability of threats.187 Therefore, 
organizational solutions to intelligence failures share three common, central problems: “first, 
the great majority of procedural changes that address specific pathologies introduce or 
emphasize in effect other pathologies. Secondly, alterations of the analytic process of an 
intelligence body are highly unlikely to fully transcend the constraints of ambiguity and 
ambivalence. Finally, more technologically complex information systems cannot fully 
compensate for the psychological predispositions, perceptual idiosyncrasies or the time 
constraint. Because virtually all information is analyzed, assessed and put together by human 
beings, solutions are bound to be limited in effectiveness, as they cannot alter the human 
though process and other permanent limitations such as time and space, excess and ambiguity 
of information.”188  The validity of this logic will be tested against the two most common 
solutions. 
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Worst-Case analysis  
Worst-case scenario, or in other word, the Cassandra Syndrome, is very often manifested as a 
common response to relatively recent intelligence failure and a traumatic surprise. 
Theoretically, it is suggested that in order to reduce uncertainty concerning enemy’s intentions, 
one engages in worst-case analysis, which will assess intelligence through the prism of the 
worst-case available interpretations.  Of course, if there is an actual disaster, this method is 
always justifiable. Nonetheless, standardizing this approach for day-to-day procedure makes it 
organizationally dysfunctional and dangerous.189 
 The price for the implementation and operationalization of this reform is almost always 
unacceptably high, as the reform introduces certain other counter-productive pathologies such 
as excessive defense spending. This is not only economically problematic for the respective 
state, but it is also very dangerous because increased defense spending almost always lead 
similar increases in defense budgets of the respective neighboring states. Given that 
uncertainty is irresolvable, and taking into consideration the Stag Hunt Analogy190 and the 
Security Dilemma,191 it is easy to see how worst-case scenario can actually provoke unnecessary 
escalation, which may include pre-emption. Henceforth, it may prove as a destabilizing factor. 
Above all, the greatest problem that this approach introduces is the routinization. Namely, as 
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Betts has observed, “routinization corrodes sensitivity. Every day that an expected threat does 
not materialize further dulls receptivity to the reality of danger.”192 Ergo, this approach 
exacerbates the “cry-wolf syndrome,”193 which in turn most likely will lead to alert-fatigue.194 
As Betts suggests, if every time whenever an iota of doubt arises, “someone rings the bell in 
White House, leaders will start putting cotton in their ears.”195  From another perspective, “for 
analysts, this syndrome creates an incentive to make deliberately vague estimates to avoid the 
professional censure and personal ridicule involved in offering clear, but inaccurate analyses. In 
effect, the intellectual challenges involved in predicting the opponent’s behavior can be 
daunting.”196 Hence, by”seeking to cover all contingencies, worst-case analysis loses focus and 
salience; by providing theoretical guide for everything, it provides a practical guide for very 
little.”197 
 
Multiple advocacy  
Many scholars and practitioners consider verisimilar the assumption that failures often occur, 
because of the dismissal or inattention of decision-makers towards unpopular, not mainstream 
views.  In order to alleviate the probability of such a mistake, Alexander George proposes 
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institutionalizing a balanced, open and managed process of debate, so that no relevant 
information or assessment will be marginalized or ostracized.198  
The problem with this approach is that by maximizing the available perspectives, there is a 
considerable possibility that multiple advocacy can simply highlight the ambiguity and 
ambivalence in the process of evaluation. Henceforth, this approach may reinforce erroneous 
arguments, because essentially this method provides all multifarious perspective with an “aura 
of empirical respectability.” In effect, this would increase the ambivalence of information, 
which is problematic, because the impact of preconceptions is directly proportional to the 
increase of ambivalence of information.199 On the other hand, this approach provokes 
implications for the process of decision-making, as well. Concretely, this approach allows a 
leader to choose which ever accords with his predisposition. What is more, since a high chance 
exists that the approach would increase ambivalence, if leaders are indecisive; multiple 
advocacy in effect is promoting conservatism and paralysis of the executive.200 
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Chapter 4  
The Yom Kippur intelligence failure of 1973 
 
 “For me, the week between 1 October and 6 October, in the Southern Command, was the most 
normal week. I did not see anything irregular.” From the testimony of Lieutenant-General David 
Elazar, Israeli Defense Force Chief of Staff, in front of the Agranat investigation Commission.201 
 
Introduction  
The sudden attack of the Egyptian and Syrian armies and their occupation of the “Bar-Lev” 
defense line along the Suez Canal and large portion of the Golan Heights posed the most 
serious threat to Israeli existence since the 1948 war. In the words of Defense Minister Moshe 
Dayan in the morning of October 7, “the Third Temple was in danger...”202  
The temporary Arab military success was the direct result of Israeli military intelligence’s 
(AMAN) failure to provide the political and military echelons with high-quality strategic warning 
of the impeding attack, a warning which according to Israeli Military Doctrine was expected to 
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be given at least 48 hours before the beginning of the war in order for the Israeli Reserve Forces 
to be mobilized and deployed.203   
In the literature, the Yom Kippur intelligence debacle has provoked a wide debate on its causes. 
On the one hand, Ben-Zvi, Richard Betts and Ephraim Kahana assert that the source of the 
failure was the inclination among senior Israeli commanders to place more importance on 
strategic assumptions, epitomized in the Concept, than to information from the tactical level 
which indicated the imminence of war.204  On the other hand, Avi Shlaim, Arie Kruglanski and 
Bar-Joseph have focused on explaining the intelligence failure by a number of organization and 
psychological obstacles.205 Two veterans AMAN officers pushed forward the argument that the 
psychological milieu, in which the estimation process was taking place, may also be an 
important factor. Zvi Lamir found that the failure was the outcome of Israelis misconceiving 
themselves and their military and political image. Yoel Ben-Porat maintained that pretension 
and arrogance on behalf of the senior officers in AMAN also played a major part in why the 
intelligence blunder occurred.206  
Because, theoretically, intelligence failure in itself is a multifactorial phenomenon, provoked by 
the function of numerous, interrelated and unavoidable dynamics,207  from an analytical 
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perspective, the aforementioned explanatory formats are mutually supportive. Henceforth, it is 
not analytically consistent with the evidence and accounts to regard the Yom Kippur 
intelligence fiasco as the outcome of lack of information. Per contra, as Richard Betts posits: “In 
the Autumn of 1973, monitoring assets performed admirably, yet detection of Arab preparation 
was not translated into sufficient warning.”208 Therefore, since Yom Kippur intelligence failure 
was not the product of insufficient information, it is much more analytically plausible to 
conceive the failure as the result of the existence of a number of endemic factors, which 
exerted negative effects on the clarity and accuracy of the intelligence and the warning-
response processes. Namely, the failure was triggered by the inherent and inevitable 
pathologies of information and human cognition, which disrupt the individual’s ability to 
perceive reality accurately, the endemic obstacles in the warning–response process that erode 
the victim’s receptivity to warnings and obstruct the flow of relevant information, and the 
problematic relationship between senior intelligence officers and senior policy-makers, where 
the former manifested a tendency to interfere with the political process, and the latter 
demonstrated an inclination to concur with the intelligence assessment, which may have 
created monolithic views on the likelihood of war and correctness of estimates.209  
However, as Bar-Joseph has observed, “The general explanations that have been suggested so 
far help to understand the causes for the 1973 intelligence fiasco do not suffice to bridge the 
gap between the exceptional quality of the war information that Israel had prior to the war and 
the low quality of AMAN’s warning.” Therefore, the lacuna, needed to bridge the gap is another 
type of explanation, which focuses on the structure and the personal characteristics of Israel’s 
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top analysts in 1973”210- the Director of AMAN (DMI), Major-General, Eli Zeira, and the head of 
Egyptian Affairs section, Lt.-Col. Yona Bandman, who were the main people responsible for 
providing policy-makers with a distorted intelligence picture. It must be noted that this paper 
will analyze only the effects of Zeira’s actions. 
 Furthermore, according to Bar-Joseph, in Zeira’s case, “the bias toward a reassuring estimate 
was a motivated one. As a result of this behavior, the decisions taken by Defense Minister, 
Moshe Dayan and the Chief of Staff, David Elazar did not reflect the graveness of the situation 
and did not meet even the minimal Israeli Defense Force (IDF) deployment plans for a 
possibility of war.”211 Ergo, the intelligence failure is neither the result of insufficient 
information, nor of high-quality deception; as most scholars have concurred, at the root of the 
1973 fiasco are certain pathologies, which were found in similar cases as well,212 and which, as 
Wohstetter has observed, effect “…honest, dedicated and intelligent men.”213  
It must be noted that this chapter will heavily borrow from Uri-Bar Joseph’s works on the 
subject, because in his analyses he used previously undisclosed authentic primary sources such 
as documents both from intelligence reports and protocols from discussions, and interviews, 
which Bar-Joseph has conducted with officers, involved in the failure. Henceforth, the 
documents reveal what AMAN’s estimates were, while the interviews show the ratio decidendi 
behind them. 214 
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The theory-driven rationale behind the Concept and its inclinations 
The Concept, a term coined by the Agranat Commission, was a framework which imposed order 
and significance for incoming intelligence pieces concerning the likelihood of war.215 According 
to the Agranat Commission, “at the root of Israel’s intelligence failure was ‘the persistent 
adherence of intelligence officers to what they termed as ‘the conception.”216 The reasons for 
this is that, first of all, the Concept was a continuation of past operational logic from late 1968, 
advocated by the Chief of the General Staff, Maj. Gen. Ezer Weitzman, and Brig. Gen. Benny 
Peled of the Israeli Air Force (IAF), which predicted continuation in the future conduct of Egypt 
and Syria, as observed in 1968, because of their military inferiority.217  Secondly, the Concept 
was a clear example of mirror-imaging, or “the process of estimating a respective situation or 
decision from one’s own cultural or national perspective.”218 Specifically, Egypt was estimated 
not to risk war with Israel unless the former attains the ability to destroy the Israeli chief 
airfields either by long-range Sukhoi bombers or by Scud missiles. Thereby, neutralizing Israel’s 
greatest advantage over the Arab state- its military aviation.  Secondly, Syria, being the military 
weaker in relation to Egypt, would not embark on full scale attack against Israel unless it is done 
simultaneously with Egypt- action which would compensate its military inferiority.219  The 
rationale that Egyptian decision to embark on war would be determined by its rationalization 
that it is in a militarily and strategically inferior position, inspired confidence in Israeli policy-
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makers.220 Two months before the war, Moshe Dayan stated that: “The over-all balance of 
power is in our favor and this fact is overwhelmingly decisive in the face of all other 
considerations and prevents the immediate renewal of war.”221 He and some of the other 
senior commanders and decision-makers appear to have fallen victims to their own policy, 
which insisted that Arabs would not dare attack Israel.222 
However, as Heuer notes, “Failure to understand that others perceive their national interests 
differently from the way we perceive those interests is a constant source of problems in 
intelligence analysis.”223  Very often, when foreign behavior is regarded as aberrant and out of 
the norm, “this indicates that analysts have projected their own national and cultural values 
and conceptual frameworks onto the foreign leaders and societies, rather than understanding 
the logic of the situation as it appears to them.”224 It is clear now that since coming to power in 
late 1970, Syrian President Asad had strived for a coordinated Egyptian-Syrian military initiative 
to regain the Golan and Sinai, and in October, 1973 President Sadat intended to go to war with 
or without surprise.225 The problem of mirror-imaging is further evident from Sadat’s testimony 
that, “Israeli military successes had created a false picture. Contrary to popular conception, 
they were not invincible and we were not inept. I had to win back honor and prestige for my 
people-not only in Egypt but throughout the Arab world. It would be necessary to inflict losses 
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on Israel. The myth that they were unbeatable had grown, but I knew the reality: Israel is a 
small country, little able to suffer a significant loss of soldiers, property, and equipment.”226 
Furthermore, according to the Agranat Commission, the concept was the highest in the ranking 
of pitfalls that have awaited Israeli analysts.227  This can be attributed to the fact that whenever 
both strategic and tactical assumptions of actualities converge, an immediate threat will be 
perceived, leading the observing state to take precautionary measures. However, when 
discrepancies are detected between tactical indicators and strategic assumptions, the latter 
most likely prevail.228 For example, during the week preceding the Yom Kippur War, Israeli 
intelligence officers in the Southern and Northern Commands accumulated a broad complex of 
credible information indicating tactical actualities. For example, on the morning of October 5, 
on the Syrian front, medium artillery was brought forward. Sizable quantities of armor attached 
to infantry divisions were moved up to the front lines. Simultaneously, the tanks of the armor 
reserve closed in. Fighter-bombers moved to forward fields. On the Egyptian Front, artillery was 
pouring into the front and the Egyptian Army was clearly shifting of a type bridging equipment 
never seen before up to the water's edge. Those tactical maneuvers indicated readiness for an 
offensive, thus there was no doubt that technically and operationally the Arab armies were 
ready to strike.229  As the Agranat Committee noted, "On the eve of the war, a vast body of data 
had been accumulated, indicating an unprecedented deployment of enemy troops along the 
front. Nevertheless, on the eve of war, the accumulated data did not affect the strategic 
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thinking of Israel's decision makers.”230 The reason why this occurred is that, as Richard Betts 
has noted, “Strategic premises smothered tactical indicators.”231 Or as Ephraim Kahana put it, 
“concepts, when they become dominant paradigms of thinking, acquire an inherent 
strength.”232 Ergo, the most basic reason for the Yom Kippur intelligence disaster lies in the 
overpowering political and military pre-conceptions of Israeli officials. Particularly indicative in 
this respect is a report, written by Yona Bandman, which demonstrates the overpowering 
effects of strategic conception over tactical indicators:”Though the actual taking up of 
emergency position on the Canal appears to contain indications testifying to an offensive 
initiative, according to our best evaluation, no change has occurred in the Egyptian assessment 
of the balance of power between their forces and the IDF. Therefore, the probability that 
Egyptians intent to resume hostilities is low.”233  
 
Confirmation bias  
Distortion of intelligence analysis because of confirmation bias can be observed when Syrians 
began, at a relatively early stage, to reinforce their ground forces. The summation of the weekly 
report of AMAN’s Research Department for the first week of September, reported that on the 
3rd of the month, the level of readiness of Syrian air and land forces was increased and that the 
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front line had been reinforced with a considerable number of intermediate-range artillery 
batteries. A few days later, AMAN reported that on the night between September 7 and 8, the 
level of readiness of the Syrian Air Force was raised to a higher standard, and reconnaissance 
flight, taken on September 11, showed that the Syrians continued reinforcing their front line 
units. Despite this evident Syrian escalation in battle readiness, AMAN’s explanations for these 
moves were relatively calming. At first, the front line’s reinforcement was connected to 
preparations for terrorist activity, and the raised state of alert was explained by the scheduled 
visit of President Asad to Algeria. Thus, when the IDF senior commanders met on September, 9 
to discuss the Syrian deployments, DMI Zeira estimated that the reinforcement of the front line 
toward the fall, a period during which forces were normally reduced, was occurring since Syrian 
training exercises had started later than usual that year.  Further gradual Syrian preparations, 
reinforcements and readiness were explained by Zeira against the backdrop of an incident of 
September 13 between IAF and Syrian Air Force, which resulted in the loss of several Syrian 
Mig-21 fighters.234 
In a like manner, on September 30th, despite the emergency Egyptian activity along the canal or 
the advancement to the front of vast quantities of live ammunition, not fitting the pattern of a 
routine exercise such as Tahrir-47, the head of the Research Department, Arie Shalev, explained 
this unusual military activity by a fear of the IDF.235  
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Cognitive dissonance  
 
A typical example of the probable impact of cognitive dissonance is the fact that when 
Lieutenant Simon-Tov wrote reports between October 1 and 3, stating that Egyptian maneuvers 
are inconsistent with the explanation that they are part of exercise Tahrir-47, hence, they are 
probably camouflage for an attach, his reports were stopped from moving higher than Southern 
Command because they contradicted the view of the Headquarters.236 Another instance which 
is indicative of the effect of cognitive dissonance is the interpretation that AMAN’s intelligence 
experts gave to the sudden Soviet evacuation that started on October 4. They offered three 
explanations— two that concurred with the dominant logic and a third that suggested that the 
Soviets were aware that Egypt and Syria planned to attack Israel. At the discussion in Dayan’s 
office on morning of October 4, senior officers found the first two explanations to be invalid. 
Indeed, as Sadat has written, “In reality, we could not have initiated an assault while the Soviet 
advisors remained in country. I needed freedom of action to face the Israelis without the 
limitations direct superpower involvement imposed.”237 
Nonetheless, DMI Zeira continued maintaining the validity of the first two interpretations by 
adding another component- the Soviets may think that the Egyptians and the Syrians intend to 
attack, but they do so “since they do not know the Arabs well.”238 In the case of the Head of 
Branch 6, the impact of cognitive dissonance continued to be felt even after the war. When 
asked why he ignored the information that said that Egypt’s military preparations were for war 
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rather than an exercise, Bandman explained that he did not attach much value to junior field 
sources that saw preparations for an exercise as preparations for war.239   
 
 
 
Factors eroding the warning-response process 
The Cry-wolf syndrome 
According to Bar-Joseph, “the cry-wolf syndrome had a devastating effect on Israel’s war 
readiness.”240 The erosion of the warning-response process is derived from the fact that three 
times prior to the war—at the end of 1971, at the end of 1972, and in the spring of 1973—it 
appeared as if Egypt may start a war. Accordingly, the respective measures to meet such a 
possibility were taken, nevertheless, war did not occur. As Sadat himself claims, at the end of 
1971, “The year of decision” and in late 1972, he had no intention to initiate hostilities.241 In 
contrast, in the spring of 1973 there was, probably, a genuine intention to go to war, which did 
not materialize because of Syria’s insufficient war readiness.242 From this perspective, the three 
events reduced Israel’s war awareness, as AMAN related the outcome of each of these three 
instances to an Egyptian bluff that failed to reach its target. When in reality war was impending 
at the end of the summer, the tendency of AMAN’s chief analysts to assess the warnings 
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through the prism of the three previous events was already fixed. And the analysts who 
maintained earlier that Egypt was going for war started doubting the validity of their 
assessment. In the fall of 1973 they were already nicknamed “alarmists” and they were in a 
weaker position to challenge the dominant conception.  
The cry-wolf syndrome also affected the civilian and military policy-makers. Prime-Minister 
Golda Meir, due to the alarms of May and June, confessed her “mind was put to rest about the 
question of sufficiently early warnings.”243 Similarly, Dayan, who in May 1973 ordered the IDF 
to prepare for war in the second half of the summer, radically changed his mind, when war did 
not erupt in the weeks that followed. Hence, in July, he forecasted that war was not likely to 
erupt in the coming decade.244 
Furthermore, because the earlier warnings did not materialize, the syndrome also hindered the 
effectiveness of certain high-value HUMINT Sources. Bar-Joseph, after conducting interviews 
with Aharon Levran, a high-ranking AMAN officer during the war, Zvi Zamir, the head of the 
Mossad, asserts that Israel top HUMINT sources- King Hussein and Dr. Ashraf Marwan, became 
nervous, indecisive and demonstrated reservations  in alerting their handlers and delivering 
information concerning the likelihood of war since their warnings  did not materialize.245 
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AMAN’s monopoly of national intelligence estimates and the dangers of 
politicization  
AMAN was the sole intelligence agency, which had dominance concerning estimates, because 
Mossad and the Israeli Foreign Office did not possess analytical organs. In principle, analysts of 
the Research Department were the only ones who received top-secret information. Henceforth, 
their assessments were automatically regarded as analytically superior in comparison to the 
others from within Israeli intelligence community.  This, nevertheless, fostered a negative 
dynamic of dependency, as the Chief of Staff and policy-formulators were completely 
dependent on AMAN’s estimates, expertise and knowledge. This, on the other hand, 
consolidated the monolithic perception of the correctness of AMAN’s estimates. Consequently, 
the result of this dynamic was that just before the war occurred, there was not a single person 
or agency that could present an alternative to AMAN’s dominant estimates. 246  
It appears that politicization has also affected AMAN’s analytical process. Concretely, Zeira 
regarded discussion as something unnecessary. According to Bar-Joseph, he used to humiliate 
officers who, according to his opinion, came unprepared for meetings. At least once, he was 
heard to say that those officers who estimated in spring 1973 that war was likely should not 
expect promotion. Thus, Zeira reinforced his estimates and prevented constructive dialogue 
from occurring, thereby, discouraging open and frank debate.247 
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Rivalry within Israeli intelligence community and within AMAN’s Research 
Department 
 
The fact that the Mossad was responsible for handling HUMINT contributed to the inclination of 
certain AMAN officers to de-emphasize the value of the intelligence, received from these 
sources, which ipso facto, was highly significant, because most of the information about the 
intention to launch war was derived from these sources. 248 
Furthermore, there are indications that the Mossad’s Chief, Zvi Zamir, did not attend some of 
the most crucial discussions, such as the one at the Prime Minister’s office on October 3, 
because of AMAN’s interest in maintaining its monopoly in the domain of national intelligence 
estimates.  
Within AMAN’s Research Department, it seems plausible to assert that there was rivalry 
between the dominant group, which believed in the validity of the “Concept”, consisting of the 
department’s head, his two deputies, the head of the basic division, and the heads of Branches 
3 and 6, and the group that consider war as probable, which consisted of the heads of Branches 
2, 5, and 7, as well as some other officers. According to Bar-Joseph, some officers from the 
latter group sensed a threat to their personal status. Moreover, they also claimed that they 
were purposefully distanced from the estimation process and did not receive certain relevant 
pieces of information. 249 For example, the head of the Egyptian political section, Albert Sudai, 
demonstrated willingness on a number of occasions to attend a discussion with DMI Zeira, in 
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order to present his view that war was imminent. Despite him being promised that he would be 
invited, he, nevertheless, discovered that the discussion took place without his participation. 
Similarly, the head of Branch 2, one of the more prominent “alarmists” was never invited to any 
of the central discussions about the likelihood of war.250 
 This certainly hampered the ability of the Research Department to conduct an objective 
assessment process.251 
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The Human Factor 
According to Bar-Joseph, “The combination of an extremely self-assured DMI who perceived 
himself more as a policy-maker than an information and assessment provider contributed 
greatly towards Israel’s intelligence failure.252 Following this line of reasoning, “it was the 
professional interference of DMI Zeira with the intelligence cycle on the eve of the war was 
probably the most devastating factor that prevented Israel from being ready.”253  
 
Zeira 
Zeira’s decision to lie to his superiors concerning the activation of the special means of 
collection, designed to provide clear indications for war in case preparation for it was under 
way, is the clearest example of his negative interference in the intelligence process. According 
to Elazar’s assistant, Avner Shalev, and the commander of SIGINT Unit 848, Lieutenant-Colonel, 
Shabtai Brill on October 1 or 2, Zeira told Dayan and Elazar, “Everything is quiet.”254 Henceforth, 
the DMI prevented Israel from receiving further indications the coming war, and, ad interim, 
distorted the intelligence picture as perceived by Dayan and Elazar. Because Dayan and Elazar 
were aware of the capability of those means, they were confident that indeed if war was to 
occur, these means would have produced indications. Thus, Zeira intentionally misled them into 
believing that the chance of war was smaller than it really was,255 and further consolidating 
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their confidence that the conception was valid.256 Elazar said that the DMI’s answer “confused 
me even more, since I knew their [the special means] capability and if there was no war 
information from them, it was a sign that all was in order. Now it is clear to me that I was not 
told the truth.” In 1993, the then-Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Ehud Barak, confirmed that AMAN 
did not use all its means of collection until the last minute.257 
Another example of Zeira’s negative intervention in the intelligence cycle is the fact that he 
unnecessarily delayed critical warnings from reaching his superiors. Concretely, he decided on 
Friday afternoon to avoid dispatching the message that confirmed that the cause of the Soviet 
evacuation was that Syria and Egypt had informed the Kremlin that they intended to launch 
war. Explaining the decision to delay this information, he told the Aganat Commission:” I saw 
no reason to alert the Chief of Staff at 11:00 pm to tell him that there is such a message and to 
add what we wrote later, that the source was not out most reliable one and that there were 
mistakes…this is how I felt that night, and I assume that the chief of staff felt similarly.” In 
addition, Zeira was aware of the discussions earlier on the 5th of October, when the Chief of 
Staff had stated repeatedly that after putting the regular army on highest alert, all he needed 
was one more war indicator to request the mobilization of the reserve army. Ergo, by holding 
the warning from Elazar, Zeira took a Chief of Staff decision which was beyond his professional 
authority.258 
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Conclusion  
 
It seems prudent to finalize this project with an account from Evan Wright, an embedded 
journalist. On the 27th of March, 2003, soldiers of the first reconnaissance Battalion of the USA 
Marine Corps were encamped on the edge of an abandoned airfield near Qalat Sukhar in east-
central Iraq. A perimeter observation team, having identified a string of lights in the distance, 
reported the possible presence of an Iraqi force, which may threaten the Battalion’s position. In 
accordance with the US military doctrine, an air strike was called. “During the next few hours, 
attack jets dropped nearly 10, 000 pounds of bombs on the suspected position.” However, 
there was no enemy; the Marines misperceived the lights of a distant city for those of an 
enemy convoy. What is important is that  “…under clear skies, in open terrain with almost no 
vegetation, the Marines do not have a clue what is out there beyond the perimeter…Its is not 
that the technology is bad or its operators incompetent, but the “fog of war” persists on even 
the clearest of nights.” 259 The numerous cases of intelligence failures throughout history, inter 
alia, Pearl Harbor (1941), the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union (1941), the North Korean 
invasion of their Southern countrymen(1950), the Chinese intervention in the Korean 
War(1950), The Tet Offensive,(1968), 9/11 and many others, seem to corroborate this claim. 
Essentially, if Christopher Layne’s observation that: “History is just one damn thing after 
another,"260 and Hegel’s postulate that: “The world history is the world court”261 are taken into 
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consideration, then it appears analytically plausible to formulate and systematize a number of 
important concluding observations. First and foremost, as Lefebvre has noted, “intelligence is 
imperfect.”262As the Butler report remarks, intelligence has not been perfect, it cannot be 
perfect, and probably it would remain imperfect.263  Further, as the history of intelligence and 
the Yom Kippur case clearly demonstrate, it is not analytically verisimilar to regard variables 
such as the geographic location of a respective actor, its power, international status or prestige, 
or its internal politico-ideological make-up as bearing pre-deterministic characters in the 
occurrence of intelligence failures. Simply put, intelligence failures “are real; they have 
happened and they will happen again.”264   
This paper has argued that the reason for this are the various, “inherent”, interrelated, 
analytical barriers, which hinder the analytical accuracy and clarity of the intelligence process. It 
is precisely those unavoidable, unalterable “enemies of intelligence” which maintain the 
irreducibility of uncertainty as analytical determinant and ensure the inevitability of failures 
over time.265   
From a psychological perspective, failures are unavoidable because the weakest link in 
intelligence is human nature.266  In other words, as one Roman proverb stipulates, “Errare 
humanum est.” It is human to err precisely because the human cognitive process is 
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physiologically limited and constrained,267 as the human memory, brain and perception even at 
their best apprehend information in ways that are limited and subjective.268  
The discipline of psychology has demonstrated that people engage far more often in theory-
driven reasoning when comprehending information , which filters the incoming data through 
the prism of pre-existing beliefs and expectations, and conditions subjectively the reality of the 
respective person. 269 „Mind-sets”, as R. J. Heuer notes, “are neither good, nor bad; they are 
unavoidable.” 270 Moreover, since various biases and flaws, such as confirmation bias and 
cognitive dissonance, have deep roots in the human cognition, they cannot be changed or 
abolished. Therefore, as Betts has stated”…cognition cannot be abolished, it is in one sense just 
another word for model or paradigm, a construct used to simplify reality, which any thinker 
needs to cope with the complexity.”271 As Nietzsche has written, “The world seems logical to us 
because we have made it logical.”272 Henceforth, at the core of the inevitability of failure, is 
“the limits of the human cognition that constrain our ability to anticipate the unexpected or 
novel, especially if the future fails to match our existing analytical concepts.”273  
From another perspective, “the key role of prediction in human affairs inheres in our stake in 
the future, for without some degree of cognitive control over the future, we humans could not 
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exist as the intelligent creatures we are.”274 Similarly, George N. Sibley has stated that, “the 
nature of political action requires an ability to forecast future events.”275 In the field of 
intelligence analysis, fostering a prognosis  is done by engaging either in structured, systemic or 
in nonstructured, intuitive approaches. However, due to the fact that intelligence analysis has 
qualitative nature, and it „ deals with an infinite number of variables that are impossible to 
operationalize because they cannot be adequately quantified or fully collected”, a great deal of 
intelligence analysts would engage in inductive approach, “in which powers of pattern 
recognition are enhanced, intuition is elevated, and identification of repeated behavior over 
time and increases or decreases in that behavior  are taken into account. 276 Henceforth, “A 
forecast is a prediction based on knowledge of past behavior.”277  
However, from epistemological perspective, predictions have an inherent analytical fallacy 
precisely because they are based on past behavior. As Hume problematizes, “In reality, all 
arguments from experience are founded on the similarity which we discover among natural 
objects, and by which we are induced to expect effects similar to those which we have found to 
follow from such objects.”278 Ergo, “all inferences from experience are effects of customs, not 
of reasoning ... It is that principle alone which renders our experience useful to use, and makes 
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us expect, for the future a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the 
past.”279  
From another perspective, the ever changing variables of time and space also represent a very 
important obstacle to analytical accuracy and clarity, as “the world is a fluid, unpredictable, 
dynamic place,”280 thus, very often both data and policy outpace analysis.281 “In this sense,” as 
Jackson has remarked,” most intelligence information is ‘time bound’ and it is usefulness 
depends upon the speed at which it can be transmitted and analyzed. 282  Henceforth, “the 
most common source of compromise in the quality of intelligence is haste.”283 
What is more, as the Schlesinger report asserted, “In a world of perfect information, there 
would be no uncertainties about the present and future intentions, capabilities, and activities of 
foreign powers. Information, however, is bound to be imperfect for the most part.”284 
Therefore, the inherent ambiguity of information and the excess of information nowadays is 
also a key analytical factor which hinders the clarity of the intelligence process. 
 Politicization as well poses an omnipresent and significant threat to the accuracy of the 
intelligence cycle, as the possibility that intelligence information will be distorted by ideological 
bias from “top-down” or” bottom-up”, is  present at every stage of the intelligence process.285  
Finally, many officials operate with the misperception that if they “shake the system up”, “set it 
                                                          
279
 http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/hume/enquiry.pdf  
280
 Austin, J. “The Psychological Dimension of Intelligence Activities”, p.  200. 
281
 Betts, R. “Analysis, War, and Decision: why intelligence failures are inevitable, p. 125. 
282
 Jackson, P. “ On uncertainty and the limits of intelligence”, p. 454; Van Creveld, M. L Command in War 
(Cambridge, Mass. ; London : Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 19-21. 
283
 Jackson, P. “On uncertainty and the limits of intelligence”, p. 454; Grabo, C.,M. Anticipating Surprise: analysis 
for strategic warning (Lanham: University Press of America, 2004), pp. 109-12; Betts, R. “ The Politicization of 
Intelligence: costs and benefits”, p. 63; Jervis, R. “Reports, Politics and Intelligence Failures: the case of Iraq”, pp. 
14-15. 
284
 A Review of the Intelligence Community, March 10, 1971, (the Schlesinger report), p. 10. 
285
 Jackson, P. “On uncertainty and the limits of intelligence”, p. 459. 
 
75 
 
right”, they will fix the intelligence system, and other disasters would be prevented. 
Nevertheless, “This is illusory. Intelligence can be improved marginally, but not radically.”286 
 The Yom Kippur case clearly corroborates the aforementioned assumptions and the general 
thesis that, “the route from collection to decision is punctuated” by these endemic barriers,287 
thus, intelligence failures “are rarely a problem of collection, but generally of interpretation.”288 
Concretely, despite the excellent intelligence which the Israelis possessed including Syrian and 
Egyptian war plans and the date when the war was to occur, and in spite of the weak Syrian and 
Egyptian deception, Israel was caught unprepared. By implementing the aforementioned 
theoretical framework, the Yom Kippur intelligence failure appears multifactorial in nature. 
Specifically, the failure was triggered by the inherent and inevitable pathologies of information, 
which disrupt the individual’s ability to perceive reality accurately, the endemic obstacles in the 
warning–response process, that erode, in the long-run, the victim’s receptivity to warnings and 
obstruct the flow of relevant information, the problematic relationship between senior 
intelligence officers and senior policy-makers, 289  and the professional devastating interference 
of DMI Zeira with the intelligence cycle on the eve of the war.290 
Therefore, “The sad truth is that the fault lies more in natural organizational forces, and in the 
pure intractability of the problem, than in the skills of spies or statesmen.”291  
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 Simply put,” errors are inevitable when intelligence organizations have to tackle difficult issues 
when the facts are few, intentions obscure and developing, fog thick, and noise levels high.”292 
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